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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Three issues are raised by this position. First, whether the Court of Appeals has
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings1 by holding a jury
instruction regarding the tax consequences of a personal injury judgment to be error but
failing to remand the case to correct such error. Second, whether the Court of Appeals
in deciding an important question of state common law2 erred in excluding expert
testimony which embraced an ultimate question of fact. Finally, whether the Court of
Appeals erred in upholding the Trial Court's admission into evidence statements
contained in a "demand or settlement letter" written by appellant in an early attempt to
resolve the disputed claim.

OFFICIAL OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion issued by the Court of Appeals referred to herein is Case No.
900461-CA, filed June 18, 1991. See Addendum.

Please see Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(c).
2

Please see Utah Rules Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(d).

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is a civil action for personal injury. Jurisdiction of the Trial Court is based
on Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3-4(1) (1953 as amended).
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to hear this petition is based on Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 45 et. seq.
Judgment of the Trial Court was entered on March 21, 1990. A Rule 59 Motion
for New Trial was served on March 21, 1990 which was denied by a Memorandum
Decision on May 10, 1990. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in response to this
Memorandum Decision on May 23, 1990. Decision of the Appellate Court was entered
on June 18, 1991.

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 45, 46
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704
(as set out verbatim in the addendum)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about May 28, 1986, the appellant, Grant Davidson, was injured by a cow
or steer that escaped from a wrecked truck driven by appellee, Erwin M. Prince, who
was in the employment of appellee, Folkens Brothers Trucking. (R. 1-2). On November
17, 1987, Davidson initiated suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah. Judgment was entered on March 21, 1990, for Davidson and against the
defendants in the sum of $27,323.88, plus interest.
Davidson submits that three errors of law committed at the trial level prejudiced
his rights and denied him a fair resolution of the action. To correct the three errors, on
March 21, 1990, the appellant made a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This motion was denied on May 10, 1990 in a

Memorandum Decision setting out that if indeed the three errors had occurred, they were
harmless errors and did not warrant a new trial. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in
response to this Memorandum Decision on May 23, 1990.

The Court of Appeals

considered the matter and filed an opinion on June 18, 1991 denying appellant's request
for a new trial. Appellant appeals this decision claiming the errors committed at the
Trial Court level were indeed harmful and prejudicial, depriving the appellant a fair
adjudication of the action.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about May 28, 1986, the defendant/appellee, Erwin M. Prince, while
acting in the course and scope of his employment for the appellee, Folkens Brothers
Trucking, operated his motor vehicle at the location of approximately SF 15, in the curve
from S.B. SF 15, in such a way so as to cause vehicle to overturn. (R. 1-2.).
2. As a proximate result of the accident, various animals that were being shipped
in his truck were released on the highways and surrounding areas. (R. 2.).
3. Appellant was injured when an animal that had escaped from the appellee's
vehicle attacked appellant. (R. 2.).
4. Appellant retained counsel and filed suit against the appellees, Erwin M.
Prince and Folkens Brothers Trucking, for personal injury. (R. 1.).
5. During trial, expert opinion on the negligence of the defendants was excluded
on the grounds that the question was an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. (Partial
Trial Transcript, Pages 22-23.).
6. Portions of a letter from appellant to appellee were admitted as evidence
supporting the defense counsel's emphasis on the distance between the animal and the
appellant. (Partial Trial Transcript, Pages 47-48, 64-70, and 73-74.).
7. The jury instructions contained information on the tax consequences of a
personal injury judgment. (R. 225.).

4

8. The jury returned a verdict for the appellant. The jury found Grant Davidson
40% negligent, Erwin Prince 60% negligent, and awarded Grant Davidson $27,323.88
(60% of total award of $45,539.80), pre-judgment interest on special damages of
$2,980.38 and post-judgment interest of 12% per annum. (R. 242-244.).
9. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's decision that expert opinion
on the negligence of the appellees should be excluded on the grounds that the question
was an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 9.).
10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court in holding that evidence out
of a letter made between appellant and appellees supporting the defense counsel's
emphasis on the distance between the animal and the appellant was admissible. (Opinion
of the Court of Appeals, 13.).
11. The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court's ruling that the inclusion of
the tax consequences of a personal injury judgment in jury instructions was not
prejudicial, but it refused to grant a new trial because the "error was mitigated by the
context in which the information was presented." (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 78.).

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS
IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
REGARDING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A PERSONAL INJURY
JUDGMENT BUT NEVERTHELESS FAILING TO CORRECT SUCH
ERROR BY ORDERING A NEW TRIAL IN THIS MATTER.
The Trial Court gave the following jury instruction (#34):
When you have arrived at the amount of your verdict, should you
determine that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, you must not add any sum of
money to that amount for federal income taxes.
I instruct you that it is the law that the amount, if any, awarded to the
plaintiff by your verdict is not income to the plaintiff within the meaning of
federal tax law.
The Court of Appeals agreed with appellant that the Trial Court erred by giving
a jury instruction regarding the tax consequences of a personal injury judgement. The
Court announced its position by declaring: "[w]e, therefore, adopt the majority view that
it is improper to instruct the jury as to the tax consequences of a personal injury or
wrongful death award.M (Please see the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, page 7.).
However, because the instruction had already been given, the court acknowledged
that it now faced a different issue: whether the Trial Court committed reversible error
by so instructing the jury. Rather surprisingly, the Court of Appeals determined that due
to the context surrounding the issuance of the instruction, which was an admonishment
to the jurors not to consider other collateral matters such as punishment or attorney fees

6

in making their determination of damages, the objectionable portion of the instruction
was not likely to have affected the amount of damages awarded. Id. at 8.
The Court of Appeals made this determination

while

simultaneously

acknowledging that "the effect of such instructions on the jury's ultimate damage award
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine." Id. at 8.

It is difficult to

understand how the court could determine the effect the tax instructions had on the jury,
when, in its own words, it "is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine [the
outcome]."
It is the appellant's contention that there is always a substantial risk of prejudicing
the jury when tax consequences are admitted. The Appellate Court recognized this
tendency when it espoused the majority position and cautioned the courts that an
instruction as to the tax consequences of a judgment should not be given by trial judges.
Id. at 8.
The end purpose of the rule is to obviously to prevent juror prejudice, but it
achieves its purpose by making it grounds for reversible error if a jury instruction is
given that even tends to mislead the jury. Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp.. 774
P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). The reasoning is simple: because it is
so difficult to determine prejudice after the instruction has already been given, the
instruction should be stopped before it ever reaches the jurors in the first place.

7

What occurred at trial is exactly what the rule was designed to prevent ~ evidence
that tends to mislead the jurors did in fact reach them. As appellant contended in his
first appeal, and as the court in Knapstad has held, the mere admission of evidence with
a tendency to mislead is reason enough to allow a new trial. Since the Court of Appeals
knew of this tendency, which it outwardly acknowledged by cautioning the courts, it
erred in not overturning the trial court.
In the present case, the Plaintiff sought a significant amount of special damages
in the form of medical bills and loss of wages, and sought general damages which would
bring the total even higher.

It is appellant's contention that the jury was unduly

influenced and prejudiced by the instruction given them on taxes. Had this instruction
not been given, the jury members would have had (1) a clearer case, unenshrouded by
complicated matters to consider, and (2) an unprejudiced view as to the amount the
Plaintiff was entitled to recover.
Because evidence was entered that would tend to mislead the jurors, the decision
of the Court of Appeals should be overturned and a new trial granted, where an unbiased
jury can seriously consider and grant a fair and just amount of damages.

8

POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF APPELLANT'S
EXPERT'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING APPELLEES
NEGLIGENCE.
During the presentation of appellant's case in chief, Mr. Newell Knight, an
accident reconstruction expert, was called to testify of appellee's negligence. Counsel
for appellant asked Mr. Knight if he had an opinion, in light of his training, skill, and
experience, as well as his investigation into the accident, on whether or not the defendant
was negligent. Mr. Knight stated that he had an opinion. When asked to express that
opinion, counsel for the appellee objected on the grounds that the question embraced the
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. The court sustained the objection over the
exception of appellant's counsel. The Court of Appeals later affirmed this decision.
For many years an expert was not allowed to offer an opinion on the ultimate
issue to be decided by the jury. However, that rule has long since fallen by the way
side, first through appellate decisions and then through the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.
See Shurtleffv. JavTuft&Co.. 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980).
Appellant maintains that the improper exclusion of this testimony was indeed
prejudicial.

The testimony of Mr. Knight involved elements of physics and other
9

sciences which can be extremely difficult for a lay person to grasp. While it is certainly
possible that some jurors possess sufficient education and understanding to comprehend
the expert's testimony in this regard, other jurors may have more difficulty in
understanding the substance of the testimony.

It is therefore necessary in order to

present a proper case to all jurors that expert testimony provide not only its scientific
basis, but its fundamental conclusion. It is to be noted in this case the jury was not
unanimous on the issue of liability, and it is very probable that the restrictions placed
upon appellant's counsel in presenting his case on all levels denied appellant the right to
a fair trial on this issue.
The Court of Appeals decision as presently written severely restricts the testimony
of experts in civil cases.

As stated, the rule will drastically alter the use of expert

testimony in personal injury actions or other cases involving negligence or other legally
cognizable breaches of duty.

Appellant contends that in a society that is becoming

increasingly complex in terms of technology and professional responsibilities, a broad
interpretation of Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in necessary in order to obtain
a complete and fair hearing on complex factual issues at trial. Rule 704 itself, by its
clear terms, recognizes the potential complexity of issues in civil cases, particularly
causation and negligence or breach of other duties in allowing an expert to testify
regarding his opinion even if it embraces the ultimate issue of fact.

The Court of

Appeals decision as written will severely limit potential expert opinions and as it stands
10

will bar much expert testimony in this state which would otherwise have been made
available to jurors to assist in their fair resolution of the issues.
Appellant believes that the court's position should be corrected and that in this
particular case Mr. Knight should have been allowed to testify regarding the issue of
negligence and the matter should be remanded for a new trial.
POINT HI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISTRICT
COURT'S ADMISSION OF STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN
A SETTLEMENT DEMAND LETTER.
In addition to appellant's claim of error concerning evidence which went to the
question of appellee's negligence, appellant also believes that error occurred in relation
to evidence which addressed appellee's claim of appellant's contributory negligence.
Appellee's theory at trial was that the appellant was negligent in cornering the animal
which had escaped from the appellee's truck and eventually caused the injury in question.
In presenting his case, appellee's counsel placed great emphasis on the distance
between appellant and the animal at the time the animal charged.

Evidence was

presented from the appellant's deposition that he estimated the distance to be
approximately 40 feet. Further evidence was elicited at trial that the distance may have
been approximately 22 feet.
However, at trial appellee's counsel attempted and succeeded in introducing a
statement from a letter of compromise written to the appellee wherein the distance was
11

estimated at 10 feet. This testimony obviously provided far greater support to appellee's
theory that appellant had "cornered" the animal.
Appellant's counsel objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was contained
in a letter of settlement negotiation. The court overruled appellant's objection and
allowed the statement to come in, and then went further to prohibit the remainder of the
letter to be presented to the jury so that the context of the communication could be
adequately understood.
Appellant respectfully submits that this ruling was in error in light of Rule 408
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That Rule provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering of promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct
a criminal investigation or prosecution, (emphasis added)
An examination of the letter in question (addendum) shows that it is unmistakably
a communication involving an offer of willingness to settle appellant's claim. The letter
is a response to a letter written by appellees indicating that they were not liable for the
accident.

In his letter, appellant briefly gives a rough account of the facts of the

accident. However, contrary to the Court of Appeal's assertion, the letter was not
12

"merely an attempt to inform appellee as to the facts of the incident." (Please see the
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, page 13.). Rather, it was an offer to compromise and
settle the claim. In fact, the last sentence of the letter reads: "You may speak with us
directly or we can send it to lawyers and to court, you decide." (addendum). This
statement is clearly an offer to settle the claim, which gave the defendants the option to
either (1) settle the matter without outside help or, (2) to take it all the way to court.
The Court of Appeals supports its theory that the letter was a demand by stating
that "appellant in the letter demands payment in full of appellant's claim and its whole
tenor is that appellant will not compromise one bit." (Please see the Opinion of the
Court of Appeals, page 13-14).

However, even though the letter contains strong

language and is indeed demanding, it is nevertheless an offer to compromise or settle for
an unspecified amount. As pointed out above, the last sentence is critical. It caps off
the "whole tenor" of the letter by offering to compromise out of court.
Since the letter was a letter of compromise or settlement, the plaintiffs statement
that he was ten feet away from the cow is not admissible. In the words of Utah Rule of
Evidence 408, "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible."

[emphasis added].

Utah R. Evid. 408.

Therefore, this

statement was erroneously admitted.
The prejudicial effect of this testimony is obviously great in the present case. A
person's conduct when confronted by a potentially dangerous animal at a distance of 40
13

feet would be different from the reasonable person's conduct at a distance of 10 feet.
Because appellee's counsel placed this question in the context of whether the animal was
"cornered", the distance is extremely important.
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals construes Rule 408 very loosely. The Court
states in its analysis of the Rule that statements used in settlement negotiations can and
should be admitted. (Please see the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, page 14.) This
is contrary to the policy behind rule 408, and if such an interpretation were allowed to
stand there would be no purpose for the rule.

CONCLUSION
The Appellate Court's decision in this matter has touched upon three important
issues in the civil common law:

the instruction to the jury regarding the tax

consequences of personal injury awards; the construction of Rule 704 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence; and the construction of 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Appellant contends that the court has departed from the previously announced
standard and in the case of the Rules of Evidence from the clear text of the Rules. Such
departure has occurred first by the Court of Appeals correctly holding that the tax
consequences of a personal injury judgment should not be disclosed to the jury and that
they should not be instructed regarding such consequences, yet after announcing such
rule failing to apply the rule in the present case by remanding the matter for a new trial.
14

Second, the Court of Appeals departed from the language of Rule 704 and the practice
in this jurisdiction of allowing experts to testify to their opinion regarding negligence in
a personal injury case when such opinion would be a helpful synthesis of the expert's
testimony. Finally, the court rendered Rule 408 essentially meaningless by allowing the
defense to offer portions of the letter written by a claimant to an insurance carrier
demanding a settlement when such letter, even though couched in strong terms, was sent
solely for the purpose of soliciting a settlement or offer to settle in the matter.
For these reasons appellant respectfully requests that his petition for certiorari be
granted and that the Supreme Court of Utah exercise its authority to review the matter.
DATED AND SIGNED this / ^ J day of July, 1991.

JE£F£RY C. PEATROSS
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jeffery C. Peatross, hereby certify that on the/^>May of July, 1991, served
four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, upon H. James Clegg, counsel for
the appellees in this matter, by mailing to him by first class mail with sufficient postage
prepaid to the following address:
H. JAMES CLEGG, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

Attorney of Record
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Grant Davidson,

MM^—
M*y T. Noonin
Cbfkaf tht Court
Utah QQun of Appeals

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 900461-CA

Erwin M. Prince and Folkens
Brothers Trucking,

F I L E D
(June 18, 1991)

Defendants and Appellees

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Ray M. Harding
Attorneys:

Ray H. Ivie, R. Phil Ivie, and Jeff Peatross,
Provo, for Appellant
H. James Clegg and Robert C. Keller, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Appellant Grant Davidson was injured by a cow or a steer
that had escaped from a wrecked truck driven by Erwin M.
Prince, an employee of appellee Folkens Brothers Truckinq.
Subsequently, Davidson filed a negligence action against Prince
and Folkens. A jury found appellees sixty percent negligent
and appellant forty percent contributorily negligent. Based on
this verdict, the judge entered a judgment in favor of
appellant in the amount of $27,323.88 plus interest. Appellant
moved for a new trial. The court denied this motion.
Appellant appeals from the denial of his motion for a new
trial. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 28, 1986, appellee was driving a truck containing
animals. Appellee negligently overturned the truck, releasing

animals onto the highway and into surrounding area. Appellant
was injured when he was attacked by a steer that had escaped
from appellee's vehicle.
At trial, conflicting evidence was introduced regarding
the proximity of appellant to the steer before the steer
charged, ranging from forty feet to ten feet. Over appellant's
objections, appellee's counsel introduced into evidence a
statement from a letter written to the appellee wherein
appellant estimated the distance as ten feet. Based on this
evidence, appellee argued that appellant had cornered the steer
and was therefore partly responsible for his injuries.
At trial, the jury awarded appellant total damages in the
amount of $45,539.80. The jury, however, found appellant forty
percent at fault and accordingly, appellant was ultimately
awarded a judgment of only $27,323.88.
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, contending the
trial court had committed three errors of law. First,
appellant argued the trial court erred in instructing the jury
regarding the tax consequences of a personal injury judgment.
Second, appellant contended the trial court erred in precluding
his expert from testifying that appellee was negligent. Third,
appellant claimed the trial court erred in admitting a
statement made in a settlement letter.
The trial court denied appellant's motion for a new trial,
concluding that even if error had occurred, it was harmless.
Appellant appeals this decision, claiming the errors committed
by the trial court were prejudicial.
I.

JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES
OF A PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT

The trial court instructed the jury on the tax
consequences of any award received by appellant as follows:
"In determining the amount of damages you may not include in,
or add to an otherwise just award, any sum for the purpose of
punishing the defendants, or to serve as an example or warning
for others. In addition you may not include in your award any
sum for court costs or attorney fees. Neither may any sum of
money be added to that amount for federal income taxes. I
charge you as a matter of law, that the amount awarded bv your
verdict is exempt from federal income taxation." (emphasis
added).

Appellant properly objected to the portion of this
instruction stating that the verdict was exempt from federal
taxation but his objection was overruled. On appeal, appellant
contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that any
recovery received by appellant would not be subject to federal
taxation. The propriety of the instructions given to the jury
is a question of law and we therefore review the trial court's
instructions for correctness. Knapstad v. Smith's Management
Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1989).
Utah courts have yet to consider the propriety of
instructing a jury on the tax consequences of a personal injury
judgment. However, "[t]he majority view in this nation, by
nearly a five-to-one ratio, is that income tax considerations
should not be impressed upon a jury." Dehn v. Proutv, 321
N.W.2d 534, 538 (S.D. 1982). The overwhelming majority of
state courts which have addressed this issue have held that,
"as a general rule, it is improper to instruct the jury on the
tax consequence of a personal injury judgment, and have upheld
the refusal of trial courts to do so." Annotation, Propriety
of Taking Income Tax Into Consideration in Fixing Damages in
Personal Injury or Death Action, 16 A.L.R. 4th 595 (1982).x
1. For cases condemning such an instruction in the context of
a personal injury suit, see Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. &
Omaha Rv. Co.. 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Mitchell v.
Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); W.M. Bashlin Co.
v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526, 532 (1982); Hildvard v.
Western Fasteners, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, 522 P.2d 596
(1974); Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576,
271 A.2d 94, 96 (1970); Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Haw. 42, 410
P.2d 976 (1966); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Rv. Co., 5 111. 2d 135,
125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Spencer v. Martin K. Ebv Const. Co., 186

Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18, 24 (1960); Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Ky. 1958); Michaud v.
Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 535 (Me. 1978); Aaunti v. Pavette, 268
N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. 1978); Amos v. Altenthal, 645 S.W.2d 220
(Mo. App. 1983); Steinauer v. Sarpy County, 217 Neb. 830, 353
N.W.2d 715, 726 (1984); Coleman v. New York Transit Auth., 37
N.Y.2d 137, 332 N.E.2d 850, 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1975);
Andersen v. Teamsters Local 116 Bldg. Club, 347 N.W.2d 309, 314
(N.D. 1984); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844
(Tex. 1979); Crum v. Ward, W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961);
Barnette v. Dovle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1367 (Wyo. 1981).
For cases holding similarly in the context of a wrongful
death action, see Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734
F.2d 1036, 1045, reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Vasina v. Crumman Corp.,

Courts following the majority view have based their
decisions on varying grounds. Some courts have held that jury
instructions concerning the tax consequences of a personal
injury or wrongful death award are improper because they
(Footnote 1 continued)
664 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Huskev Indus.,
Inc.. 536 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1976); Canavin v. Pacific
S.W. Airlines. 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82, 100
(1983); Richmond Gas. Corp. v. Reeves. 158 Ind. App. 338, 302
N.E.2d 795 (1973); Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 147 Mich. App. 337,
383 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1985); Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843,
845, petition denied, 295 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1982); Terveer v.
Baschnaoel, 3 Ohio App. 3d 312, 445 N.E.2d 264 (1982); Green v.
Dennev, 87 Or. App. 298, 742 P.2d 639 (1987); Rivera v.
Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 326 Pa. Super. 509, 474 A.2d
605, 617 (1984); Stallcup v. Tavlor, 62 Tenn. App. 407, 463
S.W.2d 416 (1971).
For additional cases holding similarly in both contexts,
see Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax Into
Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death
Action. 16 A.L.R. 4th 595 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
Nevertheless, in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S.
490 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that in a
wrongful death action brought under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act (FELA), the trial court erred in excluding
evidence offered by the defendant to.show the effect of income
taxes on the decedent's estimated future earnings and in
refusing to instruct the jury that their award to the plaintiff
would not be subject to income tax.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding, most state courts
addressing the taxation instruction issue subsequent to the
Lieoelt decision have maintained their prior position that it
is improper to instruct the jury regarding the tax consequences
of a personal injury or wrongful death award under state law
limiting Liepelt to FELA cases. See, e.g., Canavin v. Pacific
S.W. Airlines. 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1983);
Barnette v. Dovle, 622 P.2d 1349 (1981); Dehn, 321 N.W.2d at
538 (noting that Liepelt "dealt solely with federal law . . .
as applied to a wrongful death action and has been generally
limited to the particular facts arising thereunder"); Klawonn
v. Mitchell. 105 111. 2d 450, 475 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1985)
("Although Liepelt has established that in FELA actions,
juries, upon request, must be instructed that any damages
awarded are not subject to taxation, this case involves purely
State law, and Liepelt is not directly controlling.").

interject a collateral and irrelevant matter. See, e.g., Dehn,
321 N.W.2d at 539 ("income tax liability is a matter foreign to
the award of damages in that it is not a pertinent issue
bearing on the award thereof"); Mitchell v. Emblade. 80 Ariz.
398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956) (holding that taxability of award is
collateral to the calculation of damages). According to these
courts, if a jury were instructed regarding the tax
consequences of a personal injury or wrongful death judgment,
other cautionary instructions would also be required on other
collateral matters which might affect the amount of damages
awarded by a jury, such as the fact the injured party will have
to pay attorney fees out of the judgment. See Dehn, 321 N.W.2d
at 539, As noted by the Emblade court, if a jury is instructed
on the tax consequences of an award,
what objection can there be for
plaintiff's counsel to state that the
expense of trial is not provided for in
the instruction concerning damages, that
the cost of medical witnesses is not paid
by the defendant, that the expense of
taking depositions, as well as court
reporting at the trial, must be borne by
the individual litigants, that the fees of
plaintiff's attorney are not recognized as
an element, [and] that the defendant can
deduct any award it pays from its income
and excess profits tax return.
Emblade, 298 P.2d at 1037-38.2
Other courts aligning themselves with the majority have
done so to prevent unnecessary complication of trials. See,
e.g., Scallon v. Hooper, 58 N.C. App. 551, 293 S.E.2d 843, 845
("consideration of the taxation issue . . . would ordinarily
involve abundant and intricate evidence and jury instructions
on present and future tax and nontax liabilities") review
denied, 306 N.C. 744, 295 S.E.2d 843 (1982); Emblade, 298 P.2d
2. Indeed, as noted by Justice Blackmun, "[i]t is also
'entirely possible* that the jury 'may* increase its damages
award in the belief that the defendant is insured, or that the
plaintiff will be obligated for substantial attorney's fees, or
that the award is subject to state (as well as federal) income
tax, or on the basis of any number of other extraneous
factors." Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 503 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

at 1038 (noting that interjecting this issue into the
calculation of damages would unduly "complicate the trial by
requiring an intricate discussion of tax and nontax
liabilities"); Combs v. Chicago St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha
Ry. Co,, 135 F. Supp. 750, 757 (N.D. Iowa 1955) (noting that
interjecting this issue into the calculation of damages "would
probably give rise to more problems than it would solve");
Klawonn v. Mitchell, 105 111. 2d 450, 475 N.E.2d 897, 861
(1985) ("proof of pecuniary loss, not simple under the best of
circumstances, should not be rendered more complex by injecting
the question of income tax or other extraneous factors").
Courts adopting the majority position also note that there
is no evidence that juries increase damage awards because of a
belief that such awards are taxable. See, e.g., Dehn, 321
N.W.2d at 538 (noting that there is "no evidence . . . or
empirical data demonstrating that . . . juries in general
regularly increase damage awards because of a mistaken belief
that the state and federal governments share in the award
through income taxes"); Klawonn, 475 N.E.2d at 860 (quoting
Norfolk & W. Rv. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 503 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)) ("'[t]here certainly is no evidence
in this record to indicate that the jury is any more likely to
act upon an erroneous assumption about any other collateral
matter1").
A fourth reason given by courts which have adopted the
majority position is that the taxability of the award is an
issue which concerns only the recipient of the award and the
Internal Revenue Service. See, e.g., Eriksen v. Bover, 225
N.W.2d 66, 74 (N.D. 1974) (quoting Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Rv.
Co., 5 111. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955)) ("whether the
plaintiff has to pay a tax on the award is a matter that
concerns only the plaintiff and the government1"). As noted by
3. In a wrongful death action, the finder of fact must
consider the probable future income of the deceased in order to
accurately calculate the plaintiff's damages. In contrast,
calculation of damages in a personal injury action usually will
not involve the future income of the plaintiff to the same
extent. Introducing the issue of the tax consequences of a
damage award, therefore, likely will complicate matters more in
a wrongful death action than in a personal injury suit. The
majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue, however, have
applied one uniform standard to both types of cases, refusing
to create two separate rules. We believe this is the sound
approach.

the Eriksen court, "'if the jury were to mitigate the damages
of the plaintiff by reason of the income tax exemption accorded
him, then the very Congressional intent of the income tax law
to give an injured party a tax benefit would be nullified.'"

Id.
Finally, some courts have rejected jury consideration of
income tax consequences because such instructions are too
conjectural and speculative. See, e.g., Canavin v. Pacific
S.W. Airlines, 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 541, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82,
102 (1983) ("Income tax instructions are conjectural and open
the door to intense speculation."); Scallon, 293 S.E.2d at 845
("The reason courts adopt the majority view of refusing to take
income tax consequences into consideration in awarding damages
for wrongful death is that the amount of a recipient's future
income tax liability is too conjectural or speculative a
factor.").
We are persuaded by the aforestated arguments supporting
the exclusion of an instruction in a personal injury or
wrongful death action informing the jury that the judgment will
not be subject to taxation. We, therefore, adopt the majority
view that it is improper to instruct the jury as to the tax
consequences of a personal injury or wrongful death award. We
do so, however, cognizant of the fact that most courts
addressing this issue have done so in the context of deciding
whether it was error for the trial court to refuse to give an
income tax instruction. Most trial judges have exercised their
discretion to exclude such instructions.
In the instant case, the trial court gave the requested
tax instruction. Thus, we are faced with a different issue;
did the trial court commit reversible error by instructing the
jury as to the tax consequences of the plaintiff's award? Few
courts have directly addressed this issue. The courts that
have addressed the prejudice resulting from an income tax
instruction have done so in the context of wrongful death
actions and have held that "it is reversible error for the
trial court to instruct the jury that damages awarded . . . are
exempt from federal and state income taxes." Scallon, 293
S.E.2d at 845 (emphasis added); see also Klawonn, 475 N.W.2d at
857 (holding that instructing the jury that wrongful death
award was not subject to taxation was reversible error).
Under Utah law, an improper jury instruction is grounds
for "reversible error 'if it tends to mislead the jury to the
prejudice of the complaining party.'" Knapstad v. Smith's
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Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1989) (citations
omitted). Where a jury is instructed on the tax consequences
of a damage award, the effect of such instructions on the
jury's ultimate damage award is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to determine. This in some ways supports a per se
reversible error prophylactic rule. However, in the case
before us, although the court did improperly instruct the jury
as to the tax consequences of the judgment, this error was
mitigated by the context in which the information was
presented. The instruction at issue not only informed the jury
about the tax consequences of the judgment, but also admonished
the jury not to consider other collateral matters such as
punishment or attorney fees. In fact, the first part of the
instruction referring to taxes merely informed the jurors not
to add any amount for the payment of taxes.
In context, we
cannot say that the objectionable portion of the instruction
was likely to have affected the amount of damages awarded.
However, we caution that an instruction as to the tax
consequences of a judgment should not be given by trial judges
as our conclusion concerning the prejudicial impact of such an
instruction could be different in other factual contexts.
II.

PRECLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

During the presentation of appellant's case in chief, Mr.
Newell Knight, an accident reconstruction expert, was called to
testify regarding appellee's negligence. Counsel for appellant
asked Mr. Knight if he had an opinion regarding whether
appellee was negligent. Mr. Knight responded affirmatively.
When Mr. Knight was asked to express his opinion, counsel for
appellee objected on the ground that the question pertained to
an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. The trial court
sustained appellee's objection. On appeal, appellant argues
the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding Mr.
Knight's testimony because such opinion testimony is expressly
allowed under Utah Rule of Evidence 704.
4. We realistically note that juries often speculate as to
collateral matters such as whether the plaintiff will have to
pay attorney fees, costs and taxes from the judgment, as well
as whether insurance will cover some portion of the damages.
It may be useful to explicitly caution the jury not to
speculate on any of these collateral matters, but only to
decide the question of damages with reference to the evidence
before them and the court's instructions.

In reviewing the admissibility of evidence at trial, we
give deference to the trial court's advantageous position, and
do not overturn the result unless it is clear the trial court
erred. See Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d
920, 923 (Utah 1990); S££ also State v. Kinsev, 797 P.2d 424,
427 (Utah App.) ("It is generally held that the trial court has
discretion to determine the suitability of expert testimony in
a case."), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
Traditionally, an expert was not allowed to offer an
opinion on an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. See,
g.gt/ Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir.
1967). Expert testimony regarding ultimate issues, however, is
now admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 704.5 This rule
reads: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R.
Evid. 704.6
The trial court's exclusion of this testimony, however,
can be affirmed on the ground that it was a legal conclusion.
Although Rule 704 abolishes the per se rule against testimony
regarding ultimate issues of fact, it does not allow all
opinions. 'fThe Advisory Committee notes [to Rule 704] make it
clear that questions which would merely allow the witness to
tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is
the rule intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions."
5. This rule follows Federal Rule of Evidence 704 verbatim.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "since the advisory
committee generally sought to achieve uniformity between Utah's
rules and the federal rules, [the Utah Supreme Court] looks to
the interpretations of the federal rules by the federal courts
to aid in interpreting the Utah rules." State v. Gray, 717
P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986). Accordingly, this court may look
to federal law interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 704 to aid
in the interpretation of Utah Rule of Evidence 704.
6. Sfifi also Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990)
(noting that Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows an expert to
express opinion concerning ultimate issue in the case); 11 J.
Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice § 704.10, at VII-64
(1989) ("Under rule 704, testimony of both lay and expert
witnesses in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it 'embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.'").
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Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983).
Thus, an expert generally cannot give an opinion as to whether
an individual was "negligent" because such an opinion would
require a legal conclusion. See, e.q., Shahid v. Citv of
Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that expert
testimony was not admissible on ultimate legal conclusion of
whether correctional officers were negligent in failing to
provide necessary medical treatment to inmate); see also Specht
v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808-09 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that
allowing legal expert to testify as to whether there had been a
"search" in plaintiff's residence constituted reversible error;
summarizing cases in which the second, fourth, fifth and sixth
circuits held that expert witnesses may not give legal
conclusions); Hoqan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 812 F.2d 409
(8th Cir. 1987) ("Opinion testimony is not helpful to the
factfinder if it is couched as a legal conclusion."); Smith v.
Atlantic Richfield Co, 814 F.2d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987)
(upholding trial court's exclusion of expert's opinion as to
whether defendant's actions were "prudent mine practices" on
the grounds that the question called for a legal conclusion).
There is no bright line between permissible questions
under Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal
responses. Here, however, the intended response when placed in
context was an inadmissible one. Mr. Knight was allowed to
give his opinion as to, inter alia, the reason appellee's truck
overturned while going around a curve, that the truck was
traveling too fast for the curve, what the speed limit was at
the curve, whether a person hauling livestock should be
concerned with his load and what the concerns should be, and
whether a person hauling livestock could foresee the
possibility of injury if the truck overturned. Indeed, the
only evidence the trial court excluded was Knight's conclusion
regarding whether appellee was negligent. Additionally,
Knight's testimony was not technical or difficult to
understand, but was expressed in lay terms. The trial judge
did not err in excluding Mr. Knight's opinion testimony that
appellee was negligent. The excluded testimony was an answer
to a specific question which would appear on the verdict form,
a question which must be answered based upon the judge's
definition of a legal term "negligence." Questions which allow
a witness to simply tell the jury what result to reach are not
permitted.
Given that Knight's testimony was easily understandable
and that Knight was allowed to testify as to everything except
his final conclusion that appellee was negligent, the testimony

was properly excluded as the jury was capable of drawing its
own conclusions from the evidence presented and after
instruction from the court.
III.

ADMISSION OF STATEMENT IN "SETTLEMENT" LETTER

Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in
allowing into evidence statements he made in a letter to
appellee. Appellee's theory at trial was that appellant was
negligent in cornering the steer which had escaped from
appellee's truck. In support of this theory, appellee
emphasized the distance between appellant and the animal at the
time the animal charged. As noted earlier, appellant in
deposition testimony estimated the distance to be approximately
forty feet. Additional evidence was presented at trial that
the distance may have been approximately twenty-two feet. At
trial, appellee's counsel introduced a statement from a letter
written to appellee wherein appellant estimated the distance at
ten feet, a distance which tended to support appellee's
theory. Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting
this statement because it was made as part of settlement
negotiations.
The admissibility of settlement negotiations is governed
by Utah Rule of Evidence 408 which states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or
promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a
7. Furthermore, Rule 704 must be read in conjunction with the
other rules of evidence. Thus,
while [Rule 704] permits expert opinion
testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704
does not mean that all opinions are
admissible into evidence. Rules 701 and
702 require, respectively, that the
opinions of lay and expert witnesses
assist the trier of fact. And Rule 403
provides for the exclusion of evidence
which wastes time. Thus, if a witness's
opinion will do little more than tell the
jury what result to reach, it will be
inadmissible.
10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice § 704.02, at
VII-63 (1989).

valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount,
is not admissible to prove liability for
or invalidity of the claim or its amount.
Evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations is likewise not
admissible. This rule does not require
the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is
presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This rule also does not
require exclusion when evidence is offered
for another purpose, such as proving bias
or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.
Utah R. Evid. 408. This rule follows verbatim Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 which was used as a model in drafting the Utah
Rules. See Fed. R. Evid. 408. Accordingly, this court looks
to federal law interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 408 to
define the contours of Utah Rule of Evidence 408. See Gray,
717 P.2d at 1317; see also note 5, supra.
"In order for the exclusionary rule to attach, the party
seeking to have evidence of offers to compromise or statements
made in the course thereof excluded must show that the
discussions in question were made in 'compromise
negotiations.'" 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal
Practice § 408.04 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
The letter in question, from appellant and his wife to
appellee, begins by reviewing the factual circumstances of the
accident8 and it is in this factual recitation that appellant
8.

This portion of the letter reads:
It appears you have been poorly
informed as to Mr. Grant Davidson's injury
claim.
Please allow us to clarify: Mr.
Davidson while performing his job for the
D & RGW Railroad, saw the injured cow
sitting on the railroad. He stopped and
got out some 10 feet from the animal. He
made no move towards the injured cow but
while standing still was charged. He fled

admits "he stopped and got out some 10 feet from the animal."
Following this recitation of facts, the letter continues by
stating, "[w]e don't intend to let you or that trucking company
off, with a letter telling us that your [sic] not
responsible-" In conclusion, appellant's letter states, "[y]ou
may speak with us directly or we can send it to lawyers and to
court, you decide."
We believe the trial judge was correct in admitting the
statement from the letter sent by appellant to appellee because
the letter was not an offer to compromise appellant's claim,
nor was it written as part of settlement negotiations. To the
contrary, this letter is merely an attempt to inform appellee
as to the facts of the incident. Furthermore, appellant in the

(Footnote 8 continued)
the cow, but it caught him, goring him in
the back and sending him air born for
approximately 20 feet where he landed on
the rail on his knee.
The attack continued with the cow
attempting to trample Mr. Davidson to
death, as he lay stunned with a concussion
on the ground he pushed the animal off and
escaped to the safety of a rail car.
The cow continued to charge repeatedly
and finally moved off. It then charged
many others before it was killed.
Mr. Davidson did not pursue, chase or
attempt to move the cow. As it (the cow)
was injured in the accident, it became
abnormally dangerous.
We have been advised by legal counsel
that the contents of a truck, when they
spill and are dangerous (as this case) are
the responsibility of the insurer when
those dangerous contents injure innocent
people.
Mr. Davidson has a permanent knee
problem, and must wear a brace while doing
any work. He's had 16 years with this
job, which is now jeopardized by this
injury. He has lost wages, has great
suffering and now is going to be disabled
the rest of his life.

letter demands payment in full of appellant's claim and its
whole tenor is that appellant will not compromise one bit.
9. Even if appellant's letter was construed to be a statement
made in settlement negotiations, courts construing Federal Rule
of Evidence 408 and similar state rules have held that evidence
of statements made in settlement negotiations can and should be
admitted for purposes of impeachment. For example, in United
States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Olvmpia Wings, Inc., 89 6
F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990), the court held that the trial court
had properly acted within its discretion under Rule 408 when it
admitted evidence of a settlement that was offered to impeach
the plaintiff's earlier deposition testimony. In so holding,
the court stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 "permits
settlement evidence for any purpose except to prove or disprove
liability or the amount of the claim. Ld. at 956 (citing
Belton v. Fibreboard, 724 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1984)).
Similarly, in County of Hennepin v. AFG Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d
149 (8th Cir. 1984), the court allowed evidence of a settlement
to impeach. The court stated that although Rule 408 excludes
evidence of a settlement to prove liability, it "'does not
require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
purpose, such as proving the bias or prejudice of a witness
. . . ,'M adding that "[t]he Rule codifies a trend in case law
that permits evidence of a settlement to impeach." id- at
152-53 (citing Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, in Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated, albeit in dicta,
that under Utah Rule of Evidence 408, evidence of compromise is
admissible for impeachment purposes. In Slusher, the court was
considering the effect of two statutes which were superseded by
the Utah Rules of Evidence, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-29 and -30
(1977). The court stated that "[t]aken together, the two
statutes resulted in a rule not unlike Utah Rule of Evidence
408, now in effect. In other words, they precluded
introduction of the settlement for the purpose of establishing
liability but not for the purposes relating to credibility."
Id. at 443 (emphasis added); see also id. n.12 (in which the
court stated that if Rule 408 applied to the trial in Slusher,
"it even more clearly supports the conclusion we reach [that
evidence of compromise should be allowed for impeachment
purposes].").
Thus, even if appellant's letter to appellee were to be
construed to have been made as part of settlement discussions,
it could be admitted to impeach appellant's prior testimony
regarding the distance between himself and the steer prior to
the accident.

In sum, we conclude that the trial judge did not err in
excluding appellant's expert testimony that appellee was
negligent. Such testimony was a legal conclusion and did not
assist the trier of fact and, therefore, was properly
excluded. Additionally, the trial judge did nor err in
admitting a statement in which appellant estimated that the
distance between himself and the steer prior to the accident
was ten feet. The statement was not made in the course of
settlement negotiations. Finally, although we conclude the
trial judge erred by instructing the jury regarding the tax
consequences of the plaintiff's award, we find the error
Accordingly, we affirm.

£
Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

I CONCUR

Gregory^. Orme, Judge

I CONCUR IN PARTS II AND III AND IN THE RESULT ONLY IN PART I:

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making t!ie application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59. FJu 1JP.
Cross-Refe «ncea. — Fee for filing motion
Un -IWF ' lai, * 21-2-2.
HanHe** **or not ground for new trial,
H i e 6'

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of E i« ence,
Rule 606.

Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in
the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
to Rules 52 and 53, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) but is broader to the extent that it excludes statements made in the course of negotiations.

Cross-References. — Offer of judgment,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68.
Release or settlement of personal injury
claim, rescission or disavowal of, § 78-27-32.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Settlement agreement.
Cited.
Settlement agreement
e,
When an injured plaintiff and one or more,
but not ail, defendant tortfeasors enter into a
st
settlement agreement, the parties must
rpromptly inform the court and the other par&.
ties to the action of the existence of the agreement and of its terms. If the action is tried by a

jury, the court shall, upon motion of a party,
disclose the existence and basic content of the
agreement to the jury unless the court finds
that, on facts particular to the case, such disclosure will create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. Slusher v. Ospital, 111 Utah
Adv. Rep. 18 (1989).
Cited in Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 629 et seq.
C.J.S. — 31A CJ.S. Evidence § 285.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of admissions made
in connection with offers or discussions of compromise, 15 A.L.R.3d 13.

Admissibility of evidence showing payment,
or offer or promise of payment, of medical, hospital, and similar expenses of injured party by
opposing party, 65 A.L.R.3d 932.
Key Numbers. — Evidence *» 213.

Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with
Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). See

Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah
1979).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Cited.
In general.
The expertise of the witness, his degree of
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the
logical nexus between his opinion and the facts
adduced must be established before an expert's

opinion is admissible as to an ultimate issue.
Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah
1979) (referred to in Advisory Committee
Note).
Opinion testimony of expert witness was not
rendered inadmissible by fact that it may have
embraced the ultimate factual issue to be decided by the jury. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co.,
622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980).
Cited in Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622

P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980); American Concept Ins.
Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
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Journal of Contemporary Law. — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
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October 1, 1987

To whom xt may concern
Re; injury claim
Gentlemen:
It appears you have been poorly informed as t o Mr. Grant
Davidson's injury claim.
P l e a s e allow us t o c l a i r i f y :
Mr. Davidson while performing
his job for the D & RGW Railroad,, saw the injured cow s i t t i n g on
t h e railroad. He s t o p p e d and got: out some 10 f e e t from t h e
animal. He made no move towards t h e injured cow but while
standing s t i l l was charged. He fled t h e cow, but i t caught him,
goreing him in the back :*nd sending him air born for
approximately 20 f e e t whtre he landed on the rail en his knee.
The a t t a c k continued with the cow attempting t o trample
Mr. Davidson t o d e a t h , a s he l a y stunned with a c o n c u s s i o n on the
ground he pushed the animal off and e s c a p e d t o the s a f e t y of a
rail car.
off.

The cow continued t o charge r e p e a t e d l y and finally moved
It then charged nany o t h e r s b e f o r e i t was kiPed.

Mr. Davidson did not p e r s u e , c h a s e or attempt t o move the
cow. As i t (the cow) was injured in the accident, i t became
abnormally dangerous.
We have been a d v i s e d by l e g a l c o u n s e l t h a t t h e c o n t e n t s of a
truck, when t h e y s p i l l and are dangerous (as t h i s c a s e ) . Are the
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e i n s u r e r when t h o s e dangerous c o n t e n t s
injure innocent people.
Mr. Davidson h a s a permenato knee problem, and
brace while doing any work. He's had 16 y e a r s with
which i s now jepordized by t h i s injury. He has l o s t
g r e a t s u f f e r i n g and now i s going 1:o be disabled the
life.

must wear a
t h i s job,
w a g e s , has
r e s t of his

We don't intend t o ±e.t you or t h a t trucking company off, with a
l e t t e r t e l l i n g us t h a t your not r e s p o n s i b l e .

P<~ge Two
ac-ptember 29, 1987
You may speak with us d i r e c t l y cr we can send i t t o lawyers
and t o c o u r t , you decide.
Very sincerely,

Grant S. Davidson

Sandy J. Davidson

